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Criminal Law
by Bernadette C. Crucilla*
I. INTRODUCTION

As in prior periods, this year's survey of criminal law will include only
a few of the most significant cases and statutory amendments. Due to the
constant evolution of criminal laws in our society, it is simply not practical to attempt to make note of every legal development.1 Therefore, the
discussion is limited to those changes that will have the widest application and interest to criminal law practitioners for the period from June
1, 2015 through May 31, 2016.
II. STATUTORY CHANGES

As usual, statutory changes in this survey period correlate closely with
the times in which we live. These changes include loosening renewal requirements for firearms carry licenses, permitting law enforcement use
of concealed surveillance devices inside homes, legalizing medical marijuana oil, and the usual and customary accessions to Georgia's library of
crime. Each will be discussed in turn.
A. Firearms, Concealed Surveillance, and Witness Identification
The renewal process for firearms carry permits was expanded this
year. For example, a carry permit holder is now allowed to renew his or
her license if there are ninety or fewer days remaining before the expiration of a current carry license or if thirty or fewer days have passed since

* Owner/Attorney, Crucilla Law Firm LLC, Macon, Georgia. University of South
Florida (B.A., 1993); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude,
1996). Member, State Bar of Georgia; Member, American Bar Association; Member, Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; Member, Macon Bar Association; Member,
National Innocence Network (Shaken Baby Division); Master, Bootle Inn of Court.
1. For an analysis of Georgia criminal law during the prior survey period, see Bernadette C. Crucilla, Criminal Law, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 67 MERCER L. REV. 31
(2015).
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the expiration of said license. 2 Further, the mere presentation of a carry
license set to expire shall be prima facie evidence to any probate judge
that the fingerprints of the holder are on file with the judge who issued
the license, and the judge shall need merely to request a nonfingerprint
based criminal records check within five days.3 This streamlines the
criminal records check process for the applicant so that new fingerprint
4
cards do not need to be obtained every time a renewal license is sought.
Furthermore, in order to ensure court records are kept up to date, the
statute now mandates all judges presiding over a case wherein a felony
conviction results to inquire at sentencing whether the person holds a
weapons carry license.5 If so, then he or she must notify the judge who
issued the license of the change in conviction status such that the individual will not be erroneously issued another permit.6
Concealed surveillance laws have been updated such that law enforcement officials (or their agents, such as confidential informants) can now
freely record the actions of a person if taken in the presence of the law
enforcement officer or agent, even where such activities occur in a private
place such as a residence. 7 This will make it a lot easier for law enforcement officials to record controlled drug buys.8
The Georgia General Assembly has also required all law enforcement
agencies conducting live or photo line ups or show ups9 to adopt written
policieso to help standardize such procedures and reduce suggestibility. 11

2. See Ga. H.R. Bill 492 § 6, Reg. Sess., 2015 Ga. Laws 805 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 1611-129(a) (2011 & Supp. 2016)).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Ga. H.R. Bill 492 § 6, 2015 Ga. Laws 807-10 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129(e)(2)
(2011 & Supp. 2016)).
6. Id.
7 Ga. S. Bill 94 §§ 1-2, Reg. Sess., 2015 Ga. Laws 1046, 1047 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§
16-11-60, -62 (2011 & Supp. 2016)).
8 Id.
9 An identification procedure in which a witness is presented with a single individual. O.C.G.A. § 17-20-1 (Supp. 2016).
10 Policies shall include having a witness who does not know the suspect, photos
placed in folders and shuffled, using a minimum number of fillers, obtaining any identification in a witness' own words, etc. O.C.G.A. § 17-20-2 (Supp. 2016).
11. Ga. S. Bill 94 § 4, Reg. Sess., 2015 Ga. Laws 1048-49 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 17-202 (Supp. 2016)).
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B. Medical MarijuanaOil
With the enactment of "Haleigh's Hope Act,"1 2 medical marijuana oil

is now legal in the state of Georgia.1 3 More specifically, it is now legal to
have up to twenty fluid ounces of marijuana-extract oil containing a relatively low amount of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) if it has been prescribed by a physician and is in a pharmaceutical container.1 4 Low-THC
oil is defined as an oil that contains no more than five percent by weight
of THC, which is the main psychedelic ingredient in marijuana. 15 Possession of such an amount without a prescription is a misdemeanor.' 6
One can obtain the necessary prescription for low-THC oil for the
treatment of any of the following medical conditions: (A) cancer, if end
stage or the treatment produces wasting or recalcitrant nausea and vomiting; (B) amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, if severe or end stage; (C) seizure
disorders, if related to epilepsy or head injury; (D) multiple sclerosis, if
severe or end stage; (E) Crohn's disease; (F) mitochondrial disease; (G)
Parkinson's disease, if severe or end stage; and (H) sickle cell disease, if
severe or end stage.17
A person who possesses more than twenty fluid ounces or one who
manufactures, distributes, dispenses, sells or possesses with intent to
distribute low-THC oil is guilty of a felony that carries one to ten years
in prison.' 8 There are also ranges of punishments tied specifically to the
amount of THC oil possessed (or distributed) all the way up to a trafficking amount. 19

C. New Crimes or Sentencing Changes
As in previous years, the legislature has added to Georgia's library of
crime this survey period. When it was not outright adding crimes, the
General Assembly was making enhancements to the sentencing structure of existing crimes.

12. Ga. H.R. Bill 1 § 1-2, Reg. Sess., 2015 Ga. Laws 49, 50-54 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§
16-12-190 to -191 (Supp. 2016)).
13 O.C.G.A. §§ 16-12-190, 191.
14. O.C.G.A. § 16-12-191.
15. O.C.G.A. § 16-12-190 (Supp. 2016).
16 O.C.G.A. § 16-12-191(a)(2).
17. O.C.G.A. § 31-2A-18 (Supp. 2016).
18. O.C.G.A. § 16-12-191(c).
19. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-12-191(c), (d). Possession of 160 or more fluid ounces is considered
trafficking, with 160 to 31,000 fluid ounces carrying five to ten years in prison, 31,000 to
154,000 fluid ounces carrying seven to fifteen years in prison, and 154,000 or more fluid
ounces carrying ten to twenty years in prison. These sentences also include fines up to $1
million. Id.
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1. Terroristic Threats and Acts
The commission of a terroristic threat used to be a felony. 20 Now, however, the making of such a threat shall be a misdemeanor unless the
threat "suggest[s] the death of the threatened individual," in which case
it shall be a felony and shall carry a sentence of one to five years in
prison. 21 Interestingly, when the threat is to retaliate for (or intimidate
anyone from) attending a judicial proceeding or for providing any official
information about a crime, the punishment shall increase to five to
twenty years in prison. 22
2. Criminal Street Gangs
The Criminal Street Gang Statute 23 has been amended to increase
24
penalties from a maximum of fifteen years up to twenty years in prison.
In addition, a new section provides that any person who violates the gang
statute by giving an inmate a weapon, drugs, cell phone, or any other
contraband shall face a prison term of two to twenty years that will run
consecutively to any other sentence. 25 Additional portions of the statute
increased punishment for holding a leadership position in or for organizing a gang. 26
Some additional changes of note make the already-liberal evidentiary
provisions even more expansive, providing that evidence of a prior conviction of any gang member for any crime under the gang statute shall
be admissible against any other member of the gang, and it will not be
27
subject to any of the restrictions of the hearsay statute.
3. Incest
Incest prohibitions have now also been expanded to include relations
by half-blood. 28 For example, half and whole-blood grandparent and
grandchild are now included, as are half and whole-blood aunts and un29
cles and their respective nieces or nephews.

&

20. See O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(c) (2011 & Supp. 2016).
21. Ga. H.R. Bill 874 § 2, Reg. Sess. (2016) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37 (2011
Supp. 2016)).
22. O.C.G.A. §16-11-37(e) (Supp. 2016).
23. O.C.G.A. §16-15-4(k) (2011 & Supp. 2016).
24. O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4(k)(1).
25. O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4(k)(2). Also, no portion of the minimum shall be suspended,
stayed, probated, deferred, or withheld. Id.
26. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-15-4(d), (k)(3) (2011 & Supp. 2016).
27. O.C.G.A. § 16-15-9 (2011 & Supp. 2016).
28. O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22 (2011 & Supp. 2016).
29. Id.
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4. Harassing Phone Calls
The statutory prohibition against harassing phone calls has also been
expanded to include all harassing communications, whether by telecommunication, email, text-messaging, or any other form of electronic communication. 30 It is correspondingly now entitled "Harassing Communications" rather than "Harrassing Phone Calls." 31 In addition, the venue

requirements have changed. Proper venue shall now be in the county
where the communication either originated or was received. 32
5. Law Enforcement Animals
Last year's expansion of the animal cruelty statutes extended into this
year to apply to law enforcement animals including police dogs, police
horses, or "any other animal trained to support a peace officer, fire department or state fire marshal in performance of law enforcement duties." 33 Similarly to the animal cruelty statutes, the penalties range in
degree from "harming a law enforcement animal in the first degree" (for
intentionally causing the death of a law enforcement animal) which is a
felony and carries a possible prison sentence of eighteen months to five
years, all the way down to "harming a law enforcement animal in the
fourth degree" (for intentionally causing injury to the animal), which is a
misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature, and carries possible imprisonment of twelve months and a fine. 34

All degrees of harming a law enforcement animal require that the animal be in the performance of its official duties. 35 The statute also requires the payment of restitution to the agency harmed by the action.36
III. CASE LAw CHANGES

As in previous years, this period was also significant for its activity in
the appellate courts. Although there is no particular way to neatly categorize the case law developments, some of the more significant or interesting changes are set forth below.

30.
39.1(a)
31.
32.
33.
34.
35
36

Ga. S. Bill 72 § 2-1, Reg. Sess., 2015 Ga. Laws 203-04 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 16-11(2011 & Supp. 2016)).
O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39.1 (2011 & Supp. 2016).
O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39.1(c).
O.C.G.A. § 16-11-107(a)(3.2) (2011 & Supp. 2016).
O.C.G.A. §§ 16-11-107(b)-(e) (2011 & Supp. 2016).

Id.
O.C.G.A. § 16-11-107(f) (Supp. 2016).
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A. Insanity Defense and Attorney-Client Privilege
In a matter of first impression, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that
merely raising the insanity defense does not waive the attorney-client
privilege where the evaluating experts "neither serve as a witness at trial
nor provide any basis for the formulation of other experts' trial testimony."37
In Neuman v. State,38 the defendant was indicted and tried for shooting to death the husband of the woman with whom he was having an
affair while the husband was outside of his son's daycare center. The defense contracted with both a psychologist, Dr. Peter Thomas, and a forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Julia Rand Dorney, to provide an initial evaluation of the defendant's psychological issues and report back to the
attorneys. Based upon these reports, the attorneys then hired an expert
39
to conduct his own forensic evaluation and to testify at trial.
At trial, the defendant's trial experts testified that the defendant suffered from long standing "bipolar disorder with psychosis" and delusions
40
making him "incapable of distinguishing right and wrong." Upon learning that the defendant had met with both Drs. Thomas and Rand Dorney,
the State subpoenaed the records concerning their evaluations and interviews, over the defendant's objection. The trial court conducted an incamera inspection and then turned over the records to the State. Although they never intended to have these doctors testify, in light of the
courts' rulings on the evidence, the State decided to call the doctors as
part of their case-in-chief.41 After a hotly-contested trial that included
expert testimony from both sides, the jury rejected the insanity defense
and found the defendant guilty but mentally ill.42 The defendant ap-

pealed, and the supreme court reversed the trial court, ordering a retrial. 43 Again, since the initial experts were not hired to testify at trial
nor provide any basis for the formulation of other experts' trial testimony,

37 Neuman v. State, 297 Ga. 501, 503-04, 773 S.E.2d 716, 719-20 (2015).
38 297 Ga. 501, 773 S.E.2d 716 (2015).
39. Id. at 501-03, 773 S.E.2d at 718-19. Based on this expert's evaluation, the defendant changed his plea to not guilty by reason of insanity. Id.
40. Id. at 502, 773 S.E.2d at 718.
41. Id. at 502-03, 773 S.E.2d at 718-19. The State argued that merely raising the insanity defense waived the attorney-client privilege as to revealing the experts' records. The
trial court agreed. Id. at 503, 773 S.E.2d at 719.
42. Id. at 501-02, 773 S.E.2d at 718. The State used the Thomas and Rand Dorney
records in its rebuttal case and put forth its own experts to opine that the defendant was
malingering and was "faking" mental illness. Id. at 502, 773 S.E.2d at 718.
43. Id. at 501, 773 S.E.2d at 718 (holding the trial court erred by admitting evidence
protected by the attorney-client privilege).
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the attorney-client privilege was not waived as to them, and the records
should not have been released to the prosecutor. 44
B. Minor's Consent Issues
In two cases this survey period, a minor's consent was at issue: first in
the context of a sexual battery case, and second, with respect to the recordation of a phone call.
In Watson v. State,45 the supreme court took on the question of whether
"the victim's age alone may conclusively establish the lack-of-consent element of sexual battery."46 The defendant in Watson was tried for child
molestation against his daughter, K.P., who was under the age of thirteen. 47 The trial court gave the jury instruction on the lesser-included
offense of sexual battery, including the fact that "a victim under the age
of 16 lacks the legal capacity to consent to sexual conduct." 48 The defendant objected to that instruction and was overruled. 49 After deliberations,
the jury convicted Watson of two counts of sexual battery.50 After the
Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling,51 the Georgia
Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the propriety of the trial
court's jury instruction on sexual battery. 52
While the supreme court held that it is a correct statement of the law
that a victim under sixteen lacks the capacity to consent to sexual conduct, in relation to the offense of sexual battery, it held the instruction
given was erroneous.5 3 The court thus reversed the judgment of the court
of appeals on that issue. 54 In reaching its decision, the court reasoned
that Georgia law provides a person under the age of sixteen lacks legal
capacity to consent to sexual contact, but the offense of sexual battery
does not require any sexual contact, only non-consensual, intentional
physical contact with his or her intimate body parts.55 Thus, it held the

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 503, 506, 773 S.E.2d at 719, 721.
297 Ga. 718, 777 S.E. 2d 677 (2015).
Id. at 719, 777 S.E.2d at 677
Id. at 718, 777 S.E.2d at 677.
Id.
Id. at 718-19, 777 S.E.2d at 677.
Id. at 718, 777 S.E.2d at 677.
See Watson v. State, 329 Ga. App. 334, 765 S.E.2d 24 (2014).
Watson, 297 Ga. at 718, 777 S.E.2d at 677.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 720, 777 S.E.2d at 677-78.
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State must prove the contact was without consent regardless of the victim's age. 5 6

In London v. State,5 7 the court of appeals analyzed the admission into
evidence of a recorded phone conversation between the defendant, Bartholomew London, and his fifteen-year-old stepdaughter in a prosecution
for child molestation and aggravated child molestation.58 In that case,
the court reviewed the Georgia statutes involving the prohibition against
recording a telephone call and noted that an exception lies where one
party to the call has given prior consent.59 However, O.C.G.A. § 16-1166(b)60 provides that when the conversation is with a minor under the
age of eighteen, an order signed by a superior court judge must be ob61
tained before the conversation can be recorded and divulged.
In London, law enforcement officers had the victim (a fifteen-year-old
child) record a phone conversation with the defendant in which the defendant discussed sexual acts perpetrated on the victim. The court allowed the State to introduce the tape at trial, despite the defendant's motion to suppress. Not surprisingly, the defendant was convicted. 62 On
appeal, the court held that because the statute requires a court order, the
fact that the child consented was not enough to satisfy this requirement.63 The verdict was thus reversed with the express holding that the
defendant could be retried because the evidence was sufficient to sustain
the conviction. 64
C. Other Crimes or Acts
Two cases this survey period shed some light on what will be admitted
into or excluded from evidence as "other crimes or acts" evidence, better
65
known by practitioners as "Rule 404(b) evidence."

56. Id. at 720, 777 S.E.2d at 678.
57. 333 Ga. App. 332, 775 S.E.2d 787 (2015).
58. Id. at 332, 775 S.E.2d at 787.
59. Id. at 334-35, 775 S.E.2d at 788-89. Thus, it is perfectly legal to record a phone call
when the person who records it consents to the same. See id.
60. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-66(b) (2011).
61. London, 333 Ga. App. at 335, 775 S.E.2d at 789.
62. Id. at 332, 333-36, 775 S.E.2d at 787, 788-89.
63. Id. at 336-37, 775 S.E.2d at 790.
64. Id. at 338, 775 S.E.2d at 791.
65. Beginning January 1, 2013, the new Evidence Code applies to cases tried in Georgia. See Humphrey v. Williams, 295 Ga. 536, 540 n.2, 761 S.E.2d 297, 302 n.2 (2014). Prior
to that date, Rule 404(b) evidence was known as "similar transaction" evidence.
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In Brooks v. State,66 the supreme court analyzed the admission of
"other acts" evidence to prove identity, motive, and course of conduct in
a murder case.6 7 After a thorough analysis of the three permitted uses of
other acts evidence, the court found error and reversed the conviction.6 8
The defendant and an accomplice were charged with the malice murder
of a security guard during the burglary of vending machines at a meat
packing plant at which they were employed. When confronted by the security guard, the men tied, the guard up inside a locker room, and the
defendant shot him in the back. Prior to trial, the State provided notice
that it intended to introduce evidence that the defendant and an accomplice murdered a state trooper in Mississippi in 1983 after escaping from
prison and being pulled over in a traffic stop. The state indicated it was
introducing the evidence to prove identity, motive, and course of conduct.69

The court reasoned that, under O.C.G.A. §24-4-404(b), 70 there is a
three-part test to determine admissibility:
(1) the evidence needs to be relevant to an issue other than bad character; (2) the probative value of the other acts evidence cannot be outweighed substantially by its unfair prejudice; and (3) there must be
sufficient proof to enable the jury to find that the accused committed
the other acts.71
The court first analyzed the other acts evidence to prove identity and
found that "evidence offered to prove identity must satisfy a particularly
stringent analysis." 72 It held that, to prove identity, the similarity of the
two offenses is the crucial consideration. 73 Basically, the physical similarity must be such that it marks the crime as the handiwork of the accused, or demonstrates a "modus operandi." 74 The court found that the
specific dissimilarities of the two crimes, including the fact that they
were seven years and hundreds of miles apart, made the prior crime not
admissible to prove identity.75

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

298 Ga. 722, 783 S.E.2d 895 (2016).
Id. at 722, 783 S.E.2d at 897.
Id. at 725-28, 783 S.E.2d at 898-900.
Id. at 721-24, 783 S.E.2d at 897-98.
O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404(b) (2013).
Brooks, 298 Ga. at 724, 783 S.E.2d at 898.
Id. at 725, 783 S.E.2d at 898.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 725-26, 783 S.E.2d at 899.
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The court next turned to motive, holding that overall similarity is not
required when motive is at issue.76 However, to prove motive, extrinsic
evidence must be "logically relevant and necessary to prove something
other than the accused's propensity to commit the crime charged."7 7 The
court held that evidence of the 1983 murder did not meet the logically
relevant and necessary test, because the 1983 murder of a state trooper
during a prison escape is unrelated and unnecessary to prove why the
defendant murdered a security guard in the course of a theft. 78
Lastly, the court looked at course of conduct and held that "'course of
conduct' [was] noticeably absent from the list of purposes" in O.C.G.A. §
24-4-404(b). 79 Although that list is not exhaustive, "our Court of Appeals
has correctly observed that the 'course of conduct' and 'bent-of-mind' exceptions, formerly an integral part of our law of evidence, have been eliminated from the new Evidence Code."8 0 As a result, the court held it was

error for the trial court to admit the extrinsic evidence, and, because the
error was prejudicial, the judgment was reversed.81
Another case in this period that dealt with other crimes and acts evidence is Olds v. State.82 There, the defendant was convicted for the false
imprisonment and battery of a woman with whom he had once been in a
relationship. The State offered evidence of two other incidents, during
which the defendant assaulted other women to prove "intent" under Rule
404(b), and the court admitted the evidence. 83
The court then conducted a discussion of Georgia's new Evidence Code
and United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decisional
law (which interprets the Federal Rules of Evidence) upon which the new
evidence code is based. 84 The court then analyzed the three purposes for
which evidence may be admitted under Rule 404(b): (1) if it is relevant
for a particular purpose or "has any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more

76. Id. at 726, 783 S.E.2d at 899.
77. Id. (quoting PAUL S. MILICH, GEORGIA RULES OF EVIDENCE § 11.3, 244 (2014)).
78. Id. at 726-27, 783 S.E.2d at 900.
79. Id. at 727, 783 S.E.2d at 900.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 727-28, 783 S.E.2d at 900.
82. 299 Ga. 65, 786 S.E.2d 633 (2016).
83. Id. at 65-66, 786 S.E.2d at 634. The court noted that the court of appeals relied on
Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650, 769 S.E.2d 892 (2015), in its decision to affirm the trial
court's ruling. Olds, 299 Ga. at 66, 786 S.E.2d at 634. The Georgia Supreme Court thus
granted certiorari to clarify its previous opinion in Bradshaw. Id.
84. Olds, 299 Ga. at 69, 786 S.E.2d at 636.
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probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence;" (2) "relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice;" and (3) evidence will be
admitted if it is "sufficient to permit a jury to conclude by a preponderance of the proof that the person with whom the evidence is concerned
85
actually committed the other acts in question."
The court then observed that its previous holding was based on an
86
analysis of federal conspiracy cases, while the current case was not. Because, the court reasoned, intent is nearly always at issue in a federal
conspiracy case, it may or may not have sufficient probative value (that
is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact) in a non-con87
spiracy case to satisfy the three requirements of the Rule 404(b) test.
The case was thus remanded to the court of appeals to engage in the
proper three-prong analysis under Rule 404(b). 8
D. Inadequacy of Interpreter
89
One case in this period, State v. Tunkura, underscores the importance of an interpreter translating correctly. After his first trial resulted in a mistrial, Tunkara, who needed a Soninke interpreter, was retried.90 At the second trial, a different, non-certified interpreter was
used. At some point, the defense attorney became aware the interpreter
was giving Tunkara misleading information, and he moved for a mistrial,
which was denied.9 1 The trial judge denied the request because Tunkara
"appeared to understand the proceedings." 92
After being convicted of murder and aggravated assault, Tunkara filed
a motion for new trial, which was granted by the trial court on the basis

that "there was a complete breakdown of .

.

. what was transpiring at

trial due to the interpreter and this prejudiced" the defendant. 93 In fact,
the trial court found that Tunkara did not understand what was going
on at trial and "the principles of justice and equity" required he be
granted a new trial.94 The State actually appealed this ruling, and the

85. Id. at 69-70, 786 S.E.2d at 636-37.
86. Id. at 73, 786 S.E.2d at 639.
87. Id. at 73-76, 786 S.E.2d at 639-41.
88. Id. at 77-78, 786 S.E.2d at 642.
89. 298 Ga. 488, 782 S.E.2d 278 (2016).
90. Soninke is spoken by a tribe in West Africa.
91. Tunkara, 298 Ga. at 489, 782 S.E.2d at 279. The inaccuracies culminated in Tunkara believing the murder weapon had his blood on it, rather than that of the victim. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 489-90, 782 S.E.2d at 279.
94. Id. at 490, 782 S.E.2d at 280.
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supreme court affirmed. 95 Again, the defendant having "appeared to understand" did not satisfy the supreme court, and the decision from the
court of appeals ordering a new trial was affirmed.96
E. Sexual PredatorClassificationImplicates Due Process
On March 21, 2016, the supreme court considered whether due process
requirements apply to a person whom the state seeks to have classified
as a "sexually dangerous predator" under the Georgia sexual offender
laws.9 7 Basically, the defendant, Gregory, broadcast images on the internet to a teenage girl and was convicted of obscene internet contact with
a child.98 Under the sex offender laws, obscene internet contact with a
child is a "dangerous sex offense," and Gregory's conviction renders him
a sexual offender.9 9
The sex offender laws require everyone convicted of a dangerous sex
offense after July 1, 1996 to register annually with the sheriff of his
county of residence.1 00 As fully discussed in Gregory, the sex offender registration requirements often prohibit an offender "from residing within
1,000 feet of a child care facility, church, school, or 'area where minors
congregate.'"" 0 ' The law requires the Sexual Offender Registration Review Board (the Board) to "assess the likelihood that [an offender] will
engage in another crime against a victim who is a minor or a dangerous

95. Id. at 490-91, 782 S.E.2d at 279-80.
96. Id. at 491, 782 S.E.2d at 280.
97. Gregory v. Sexual Offender Registration Rev. Bd., 298 Ga. 675, 784 S.E.2d 392
(2016); O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 to -19 (2014 & Supp. 2016).
98. Gregory, 298 Ga. at 676, 784 S.E.2d at 393-94. Obscene internet contact with a child
is a felony offense, and Gregory received a term of probation under the First Offender Act.
See O.C.G.A. § 42-8-60 to -66 (2014 & Supp. 2016). He violated his probation two years later
and was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to imprisonment and probation. Gregory, 298 Ga.
at 676 n.6, 784 S.E.2d at 394 n.6.
99. Gregory, 298 Ga. at 676-77, 784 S.E.2d 394-95. See also O.C.G.A. §§ 41-112(a)(10)(B), (a)(20)(A) (Supp. 2016).
100. Gregory, 298 Ga. at 678-79, 784 S.E.2d at 395-96. The sheriffs are required to keep
the lists and make them available for inspection by the public, and they also must submit
the lists to the G.B.I which, in turn, furnishes the same to schools, and daycare and longterm child care facilities. Id.
101. Id. at 679, 784 S.E.2d at 396. '"Area[s] where minors congregate' includes 'all public
and private parks and recreation facilities, playgrounds, skating rinks, neighborhood centers, gymnasiums, school bus stops, public libraries, and public and community swimming
pools."' Id. at 679 n.11, 784 S.E.2d at 396 n.11 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 41-1-12(a)(3) (Supp.
2016)).
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sessment."1
The opinion goes on to note that there are three classifications: Level
I, Level II, and sexually dangerous predator.103 It further notes that offenders classified as Level II or as sexually dangerous predators can petition for a reevaluation and can submit documentary evidence in support
thereof (such as psychological testing, psychotherapy treatment notes,
affidavits, etc.), but there is no provision for a hearing in connection with
the Board's reevaluation.1 04 Alternatively or additionally, offenders classified as Level II or as sexually dangerous predators may seek judicial
review of their classifications and likewise may submit documentary evidence in support. 0 5 Within the rubric of judicial review, there is a provision for the court to hold a full evidentiary hearing upon request of the
petitioner, but that provision is permissive rather than mandatory (i.e.
the court may hold a hearing to determine the issue of classification). 106
In the instant case, after the defendant committed another sexual offense sufficient to have his first offender status revoked, the Board classified him as a sexually dangerous predator. 07 The defendant filed a petition for reevaluation, which was denied, and then he sought judicial
review. Although he specifically requested a hearing, he was not given
one by the court, which subsequently affirmed the decision of the
Board.108

102. Gregory, 298 Ga. at 680, 784 S.E.2d at 396.
103. Id. Level I signifies the offender is a low offense risk for future sexual offenses,
Level II (the default classification) means the offender is an intermediate risk for future
sexual offenses, and a sexually dangerous predator indicates the offender is a risk for perpetrating future sexual offenses. Id.; O.C.G.A. §§ 41-1-12(a)(12), (a)(13), (a)(21)(B) (Supp.
2016).
104. Gregory, 298 Ga. at 681-84, 784 S.E.2d at 397-98. A sexually dangerous predator is
subject to additional requirements and restrictions, most notably having to submit to electronic monitoring and tracking of his person for the rest of his life and having to pay the
costs for the same. O.C.G.A. § 42-1-14(e) (2014 & Supp. 2016). They additionally have to
register with the sheriff more frequently and are subject to more stringent employment
restrictions. O.C.G.A. § 42-1-14(f) (2014 & Supp. 2016); O.C.G.A. § 42-1-15(c)(2) (2014).
105. Gregory, 298 Ga. at 682, 784 S.E.2d at 397.
106. Id. at 682, 784 S.E.2d at 397-98.
107. Id. at 684, 784 S.E.2d at 399. Gregory was arrested for public indecency for exposing himself at a public swimming pool, his first offender status was revoked, and he was
adjudicated guilty and sentenced to imprisonment followed by probation. Id. at 676 n.6, 784
S.E.2d at 394 n.6.
108. Id. at 684, 784 S.E.2d at 399. Gregory did, however, submit documentary evidence
in his favor. Id.
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The defendant filed an appeal, contending that classifying an offender
as a sexually dangerous predator without affording him or her an evidentiary hearing is a denial of due process. 109 After a thorough analysis of
the elements of due process, the supreme court agreed, holding that an
evidentiary hearing must be provided, upon request, to any person classified by the Board as a sexually dangerous predator.1 10 Interestingly, the
opinion does not state whether being classified as a Level II offender
would also require a hearing upon request. Gregory's case was thus remanded for a hearing consistent with the holding."'
IV. CONCLUSION

This year was significant for statutory changes to the renewal of firearms carry licenses, the use concealed surveillance devices, the legalization of medical marijuana oil, and the addition of several new crimes and
changes to the sentencing structure of some existing crimes. Additionally, the appellate courts issued a number of decisions providing guidance
as to the insanity defense, when the attorney-client privilege has been
waived, issues regarding when a minor's consent must and may not be
proved, and how to determine when other crimes or acts may be admitted
or excluded from evidence. The courts also touched on the importance of
an adequate interpreter regardless of whether the defendant "appears"
to understand and when an evidentiary hearing will be provided in a case
involving sexual predator classification. As in previous periods, the evolving laws in this period truly reflect the times in which we live.

109. Id. at 685, 784 S.E.2d at 399.
110. Id. at 690-91, 784 S.E.2d at 403.
111. Id. at 691, 784 S.E.2d at 403.

